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Abstract—In this paper, the problem of intrusion detection
using passive infrared sensors (PIR) is investigated. We study the
output PIR signal in the light of the intruder’s trajectory and
the geometry of the sensor’s ﬁeld of view (FOV) and propose
an inverse-square law that describes the relation of incident
heat ﬂux to the distance. The signal is modeled by a sum of
exponentially modulated sinusoids. Consequently, the intrusion
detection is formulated as a hypothesis testing problem and
we propose an exponentially windowed periodogram (EWP)
detector, which is also able to detect the direction of movement.
The simulation results shows the superior performance of the
EWP detector when compared to conventional detectors such as
the traditional periodogram detector and the energy detector over
large distances. Furthermore, results show nearly 100% correct
detection of the direction of movement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection is a vital ﬁeld of research with signiﬁcant
practical impact. Several sensor modalities are used for intru-
sion detection, some of which are magnetic, acoustic, seismic,
and thermal sensors [1]. However, pyroelectric infrared (PIR)
sensors present themselves as an attractive option due to their
low power requirement, low cost, and small form factor. PIR
sensors are made from pyroelectric crystals that are intrin-
sically polarized [2]. When exposed to temperature change,
the polarization is temporally disturbed producing a current
proportional to the heat gradient. Thus, PIR sensors measure
the change in temperature making them suitable for motion
detection. Usually, two sensor elements are connected serially
in reverse polarity, thus producing a positive voltage when
motion occurs in the positive element ﬁeld of view (FOV)
and a negative voltage when motion occurs in the negative el-
ement’s FOV. Hence, PIR sensors can be found in many indoor
applications, such as [3]. Recently, PIR sensors were also used
with wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in outdoor applications
[4], due to the previously stated features. However, due to
limited detection range the outdoor applications are limited.
Therefore, advanced processing techniques are needed in order
to increase the detection range of the PIR sensors
Several processing methods have been suggested in the lit-
erature. In [5], energy detection with adaptive noise threshold
was proposed. Simple high-pass ﬁltering was also used to
improve the SNR. A combination of the Haar transform and
support-vector-machine was used in [6] to detect intrusion in
the presence of clutter. In [7], the authors proposed using a
linear regression model in conjunction with hidden Markov
models to detect and classify human walking movement. PIR
sensors were used for tracking of direction and distance of
motion in [8] via feature extraction methods. A set of two
orthogonal PIR sensor pairs were used in [9] to detect the
direction of movement.
In this paper we investigate increasing the detection range
of PIR in outdoor environments using the statistical hypoth-
esis testing framework leading to advanced signal processing
methods, in contrast to the simpliﬁed processing adopted in
[6]. Firstly, we show that the incident heat ﬂux at the sensor
obeys the inverse square law for an arbitrary source shape.
Secondly, we model the incident heat ﬂux time varying signal
as a function of the intruders’ trajectory parameters. Finally,
we formulate the detection problem as multiple hypothesis
testing.
This paper is organized as the following. Section II presents
the system model. In Section III, the detection problem is
formulated and the corresponding detection algorithms are
proposed. Simulation results are provided in IV. Finally, the
conclusions and future work are given in Section V.
II. MODELING OF INTRUDER’S SIGNATURE
In this section the time-varying heat ﬂux signature generated
by the intruder and the PIR sensor are formulated.
A. Intruder Heat Flux
We are interested in measuring the heat ﬂux generated by
a mobile intruder moving with constant speed and direction.
The intruder is assumed to be in thermal equilibrium with
its environment. The measured ﬂux at the sensor mainly
depends on the temperature, source geometry, and the spatial
orientation of the intruder and the sensor with respect to
(wrt) each other. Assuming a Lambertian grey body emitting
uniformly in space, the heat ﬂux at the sensor is [2]
Φ =
1
π
εkBωi,s
(
T 4i − T 4e
)
Ai (1)
where 0 < ε < 1 is the intruder’s emissivity, kB ≈ 1.381 ×
10−23kg.m2/s2K is the Steveman-Boltzmann constant, Ti is
the intruder’s absolute temperature, Te is the environment’s
temperature, Ai is the intruder’s surface area, and ωi,s is the
projected solid angle of the intruder onto the sensor. So the
geometry of the source w.r.t. the sensor is given by
ωi,s =
1
As
∫
Ai
∫
As
cosβi cosβs
R2i,s
dAidAs (2)
where As is the sensor’s area, βi and βs are the angles of
dAi and dAs wrt to the axis connecting them, and Ri,s is the
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
10−9
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
R(m)
Φ
(Jo
ule
)
FEM
Eq. (3)
Fig. 1: Heat ﬂux, Φ, as a function of distance R for the FEM and the
approximation in (3). The human source is modeled by a rectangular head
and body with dimensions of 0.22m × 0.14m and 1.7m × 0.4m
respectively. The human temperature is Ti = 37o with emissivity ε = 1,
environment temperature Ti = 20o, sensor area As = 20μm2, intruder area
Ai = 0.7m2.
distance separating the inﬁnitesimal elements dAi and dAs.
Consequently, the total heat ﬂux is found by solving the double
integration in (1) and substituting in (1).
For an arbitrary geometry, the incident heat ﬂux is usually
found by the ﬁnite element method (FEM), which is known
to be cumbersome. Instead, we propose the following closed-
form approximation
Φ ≈ εkB
(
T 4i − T 4e
) AiAs
4R2
. (3)
which is simply an inverse square law relationship. The the
above approximation is compared with the FEM results in
(1) for a human source at different distances. The results
show excellent matching with our approximation for distances
greater than 5 meters.
As the intruder passes in front of the PIR sensor, a Fresnel
lens modulates the incident heat ﬂux by partitioning the FOV
into multiple segments1 as shown in Fig. 2(a), where each seg-
ment concentrates the ﬂux onto the PIR sensor. Consequently,
the PIR sensor’s signal depends on the intruder’s trajectory
through the FOVs. Take for example an intruder crossing the
central FOV segment with constant speed v making an angle
ψ0 with the main sensor axis at distance R0 as shown in Fig.
2(b). The squared distance between the intruder and the sensor
is given by the cosine rule [6] as
R2(t) = v2t2 +
(
R0 sinψ0
sin (ψ0 + γ)
)2
+
2vtR0 sinψ0
tan (ψ0 + γ)
. (4)
Therefore, the incident heat ﬂux has the form
Φ(t) =
Φ˜
R2(t)
[
Π
(
t− t0
d+0 /v
)
−Π
(
t− t0 − d+0 /v
d−0 /v
)]
(5)
where Φ˜ = εkB
(
T 4i − T 4e
)
AiAs/4, t0 is the entry time,
and Π(t) is fa unit rectangular function in the time interval
1In the context of intrusion detection, such an arrangement increases the
probability of detection.
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(a) Multiple-segment FOV Fresnel lens conﬁguration. Each segment has a FOV with
angle 2γ.
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(b) Intruder crossing FOV.
Fig. 2: Intruder crossing the FOV of the Fresnel lens.
[0, 1]. In general, For (2F + 1) FOV segments indexed by
j = −F, · · · , F , we have ψj = ψ0 − jϕ for j = 0. Thus, the
heat ﬂux signature has the form
Φ(t) =
Φ0
R2(t)
F∑
i=−F
[
Π
(
t− tj
d+j /v
)
−Π
(
t− tj − d+j /v
d−j /v
)]
(6)
where tj is the jth segment entry time.
Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) show the heat ﬂux signal for an intruder
moving toward and away from the sensor.
B. PIR Signal
The PIR sensor converts the impinging heat ﬂux into an
electrical voltage. The responsivity, which is the ratio of the
output voltage to the input heat ﬂux, completely characterizes
the sensor. The responsivity is actually a bandpass system [10]
given by
H(s) =
V (s)
Φ(s)
=
Ks
(1 + τts) (1 + τes)
(7)
where K is the sensor’s gain, τt is the thermal time constant
of the sensor, and τe is the electrical time constant. Therefore,
the output voltage signal is a ﬁltered version of the heat ﬂux
in (6), i.e.,
s(t) = h(t) ∗ Φ(t)
=
Φ0
R2(t)
F−1∑
i=0
h(t) ∗Π
(
t− ti
di/v
)
(8)
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Fig. 3: For an intruder with R0 = 50m, v = 5 kmph, and ψ = 500, Figs.
(a) and (b) show the heat ﬂux, Figs (c) and (d) show the sensor signal for
K = 6.× 103, τT = 4.2 sec, and τE = 1 sec. Figs. (e) and (f) show the
periodograms of the sensor signal sampled with Fs = 10 Hz and a FFT
length of 2048. The ﬁrst column is for the intruder moving toward the
sensor and the second column for it moving away.
where h(t) is the sensor’s time-domain responsivity and ∗ is
the convolution operator. An example is given in Figs. 3(c)
and 3(d).
The PIR sensor elements are usually followed by a JFET
voltage buffer, which superimposes the sensor signal on a
dc bias of the transistor. Also, the signal is corrupted by
noise, which is dependent on the sensor and the environment
background heat radiation. However, we assume that the
voltage signal at the input of the analog to digital converter,
x(t), is appropriately conditioned to remove the dc bias and
reduce the noise before being sampled at a sampling frequency
of Fs. Hence, the raw available sensor is
x[n] = s[n] + w[n]
for 0 ≤ n ≤ N−1 where w[n] is assumed to be additive white
Gaussian noise with zero mean and known variance, σ2.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION
For a given intruder’s class (e.g. humans) the signal’s energy
is dependent on the separation distance, since the intruder’s
energy and the sensor’s noise energy are ﬁxed. Hence, we
resort to statistical hypothesis testing methods to provide
acceptable performance.The intrusion detection problem is
formulated as the following hypothesis testing problem, i.e.,
H0 : x[n] = w[n], 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1
H1 : x[n] = s[n] + w[n], 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. (9)
One way to tackle this problem is to assume that s[n] is
completely unknown, and so the optimal detector in this case
would be the energy detector (ED), with the following test
statistics
TED(x) =
1
σ2
N−1∑
n=0
x2[n]. (10)
Unfortunately, the energy detector has the worse perfor-
mance among all detectors, since no prior information is used.
Interestingly, we can infer some valuable information from
the shape of the PIR signal. Indeed, s(t) in Fig 3(c) has a
striking resemblance to an exponentially decaying sinusoid
and to an exponentially increasing sinusoid in Fig. 3(d).
This observation is also consolidated by (8). Furthermore,
Figs 3(e) and 3(f) suggest having several dominant sinusoidal
components. Hence, we propose the following approximation
s[n] ≈
L−1∑
i=0
αnAi cos (2πfin+ φi)
=
L−1∑
i=0
aiα
n cos(2πfin) + biα
n sin(2πfin) (11)
where Ai, fi, φi are the ith amplitude, frequency, and phase
of the ith component respectively. Whereas α ≥ 0 is the
exponential factor and the parameter vector, ai = Ai cos(φi)
and bi = Ai sin(φi). The above can be compactly represented
in vector format as
s = G(θ)c (12)
c = (a0, · · · , aL−1, b0, · · · , bL−1)T (13)
G(θ) =
(
gc(α, f0) · · ·gc(α, fL−1)gs(α, f0) · · ·gs(α, fL−1)
)
(14)
where s = (s[0], · · · , s[N − 1])T , the signal parameters are
lumped in θ = (α, f0, · · · , fL−1)T , and the columns of the
matrix G(θ) are
gc(α, fi) =
(
1, α cos(2πfi), · · · , αN−1 cos(2πfi(N − 1))
)T
(15)
gs(α, fi) =
(
0, α sin(2πfi), · · · , αN−1 sin(2πfi(N − 1))
)T
.(16)
Consequently, the detection problem can be formulated as
H0 : x = w
H1 : x = G(θ)c+w (17)
where x = (x[0], x[1], · · · , x[N − 1])T and w =
(w[0], w[1], · · · , w[N − 1])T . The above is a composite hy-
pothesis testing, since θ needs to be estimated. An asymp-
totically optimal detector is the generalized likelihood ratio
test (GLRT) [11]. It can be shown that the GLRT reduces to
ﬁnding the best projection of x onto the space spanned by the
columns of G(θ), i.e.,
TGLRT(x) = max
θ
‖PG(θ)x‖2 (18)
where PG(θ) =
(
GT (θ)G(θ)
)−1
G(θ)T is the projection
matrix on the space spanned by the columns of G(θ).
Apparently, the GLRT is computationally demanding
mainly due to the non-zero correlation between the columns
of G(θ). Consequently, we propose a sub-optimal detector
in which we assume orthogonal columns in G(θ). In other
words,
L−1∑
i=0
L−1∑
j=0
gTc (α, fi)gs(α, fj) =
{
N, i = j
0, i = j (19)
for all α and fi’s. Hence, the resulting detector in this case
has the form
T (x) = max
α,f0,··· ,fL−1
1
N
L−1∑
i=0
|xTgc(α, fi)|2 + |xTgs(α, fi)|2
(20)
which for a given α is a separable maximization problem, i.e.,
it has L peaks at the optimal frequencies (f̂i) values.
The detector in (20) can be further simpliﬁed by noting that
the correlations xTgc(α, fi) and xTgs(α, fi) can be decom-
posed into two steps. First, multiply the data samples, x[n],
by the window function αn for a given α and 0 ≤ n ≤ N −1.
Deﬁned the windowed data xα[n] and then the detector in (20)
becomes
TEWP(x) = max
α,f0,··· ,fL−1
1
N
L−1∑
i=0
|Xα(fi)|2 (21)
which we will call the exponentially windowed periodogram
(EWP) detector. Xα(fi) in (21) is the widowed periodogram
deﬁned as
Xα(fi) =
N−1∑
n=0
xα[n]e
(−j2πfi). (22)
Thus, the EWP detector chooses the window the gives the
greatest L spectral peaks. It follows that the periodogram
detector (PD) is a special case of the EWP detector when
α is ﬁxed at unity, giving
TP (x) = max
f0,··· ,fL−1
L−1∑
i=0
|X1(fi)|2. (23)
Interestingly, the optimal window, α̂, found earlier gives
an indication about the movement direction. If α̂ < 1 then
the signal is decreasing with time implying that the intruder
is moving away from the sensor. Oppositely, if α̂ > 1 the
intruder is moving toward the sensor. Thus,
Decide intruder is moving away from sensor, α̂ > 1;
Decide intruder is moving toward from sensor, α̂ < 1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we have simulated a human intruder passing
through the FOV of a PIR having F = 4 segments and γ =
7.5o. The intruder moves with a constant speed of v = 5 kmph
in a straight line making angle with the main PIR sensor axis
of ψ = 500 away from the sensor. The intruder’s temperature
is Ti = 37o with emissivity ε = 1, environment temperature
Ti = 20
o, sensor area As = 20μm2 and intruder area Ai =
0.7m2. The PIR sensor has K = 6. × 103, τt = 4.2 sec, and
τe = 1 sec. The noise in the system is zero-mean AWGN with
standard deviation of 50μV.
We compare the detection performance via ROC graphs
showing the probability of detection (PD) against the proba-
bility of false alarm (PFA) of the ED in (10), the EWD in (21),
and the PD in (23) (both use L = 3 sinusoidal components)
in a Monte Carlo simulation with 105 iterations. Two sets of
simulations are run, one with the intruder moving away from
the sensor and the second when the intruder is moving toward
the sensor. Figs. 4-8 depict the ROC for different R0 values
when the intruder is moving away from the sensor, whereas
Figs. 9-13 show the ROC when the intruder is moving toward
the sensor. In general, for a relatively small distance, both the
EWP and the PD achieve a similar performance as shown in
Figs. 4,5,9, and 10, while still performing better than the ED.
On the other hand, the rest of the ﬁgures show the superior
performance of the EWD over large distances. Finally, the
direction of movement is estimated by the EWD algorithm, by
testing the α̂ as mentioned before. The EWD achieves almost
100% correct direction estimation for all different distances as
shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Direction Estimation
R0 10m 30m 50m 70m 90m
Intruder moving away 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Intruder moving toward 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.89%
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have investigated the problem of long range intrusion
detection using PIR sensors. An inverse square-law relation
is established for the incident heat ﬂux and the separation
distance. Then, the PIR sensor output signal is modeled by
the sum of exponentially modulated sinusoids. Accordingly,
an exponentially windowed periodogram detector is proposed
showing very good detection performance for long distance
cases when compared to both the conventional periodogram
detector and the energy detector. In future work, we intend to
investigate the use of sensor arrays for intrusion detection.
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Fig. 4: ROC for R0 = 10m and
inruder moving away from sensor.
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Fig. 5: ROC for R0 = 30m and
inruder moving away from sensor.
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Fig. 6: ROC for R0 = 50m and
inruder moving away from sensor.
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Fig. 7: ROC for R0 = 70m and
inruder moving away from sensor.
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Fig. 8: ROC for R0 = 90m and
inruder moving away from sensor.
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